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COMMENT
EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION:
CONTINUING THE CONFUSION IN POLICY, LAW,
AND JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
An upstart American company establishes a supply relationship with a
foreign distributor. The domestic company supplies the design and makes
consistent orders, building its business over the course of three years with
imports from the foreign distributor. Suddenly, supply from the foreign dis-
tributor stops. The company finds that it cannot gain any additional supply
from the same country due to a trade association agreement granting dis-
tributors a pattern and design registration right. This right prohibits any
manufacturers in that country from supplying other distributors with the
same product design.' The American company files suit in federal district
court alleging market division 2 in violation of the Sherman Act.
This action raises the problem of whether the federal court has extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over the foreign distributor-an area of unpredictability
prompting one commentator to note that "the only consistency in the Su-
preme Court's antitrust jurisprudence is the Court's inconsistency."' The
opportunity for the American company to present the merits of its case may
be completely dependent on the circuit within which the federal district
court hearing the case resides. Likewise, the foreign company may be drawn
into litigation for acts wholly committed in its own country. This uncer-
1. These facts parallel those of Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th
Cir. 1996), discussed infra Part ll.D.
2. Market division occurs when competitors agree what products they will sell to par-
ticular buyers, thus effectively removing any competition between them.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
4. In the context of this Comment, "extraterritorial jurisdiction" refers to the power of
United States courts to adjudicate disputes involving alleged Sherman Act violations by a
foreign entity occurring outside the United States.
5. Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S.
Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. Imr'L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996).
1
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tainty in whether the case will go so far as a hearing on the merits has a dis-
ruptive effect on the competitiveness of American companies in an increas-
ingly globalized economy requiring more outward-looking and cooperative
economic policy measures.6 In a world moving rapidly toward free trade and
development of multinational corporations, an untangling and clarification
of the current jurisdictional chaos is necessary to prepare for the complex
antitrust issues that the new international economy will bring.7
In Harford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,' a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court allowed extraterritorial extension of the Sherman Act9 to adju-
dicate the alleged violations of several British reinsurers. The reinsurers
were accused of having conspired with domestic carriers to influence the
availability of certain coverages in the American commercial insurance mar-
ket.'" This decision is viewed as establishing two threshold questions which
courts must answer before extending extraterritorial jurisdiction." First, was
the conduct in question "meant to produce and did it in fact produce some
substantial effect" in the United States? 2 This question reestablishes the
"intended effects test" first set forth by the Second Circuit 3 in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America"' (ALCOA). Second, courts must determine
whether there "is in fact a true conflict 5 between domestic and foreign
law,"' 6 a question effectively eliminating the "jurisdictional rule of reason"
established by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America.7
6. Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globilization: The Hartford Fire
Case, 1993 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 289, 297 (1994).
7. See John H. Chung, Comment, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sher-
man Act, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 371, 403-08 (1996); Bret Sumner, Due Process and True Con-
flicts: The Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Lib-
erty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 907, 932
(1997).
8. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
10. 509 U.S. at 773-76.
11. See Brockbank, supra note 5, at 12.
12. 509 U.S. at 796.
13. The Second Circuit was sitting as the court of last resort, as the Supreme Court
lacked a quorum at the time. Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, followed this
decision until Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
14. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In ALCOA, an agreement formed outside the United
States between a Canadian company and a European aluminum producer attempted to limit
aluminum ingot imports into the United States. Id. at 439-41.
15. In the context of Justice Souter's opinion, a "true conflict" would exist if the de-
fendant would violate the laws of one sovereign by complying with the laws of another.
509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
16. Id. at 798.
17. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Timberlane I]. There, the Ninth Circuit
established a series of questions and factors to guide courts in determining jurisdiction over
foreign violators of antitrust law. The suggested factors focused on accounting for concerns
2
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In the wake of the Supreme Court's Hartford Fire decision, commen-
tary abounded on the new standard the Court had established for extending
the reach of United States antitrust enforcement abroad.18 Both courts and
scholars have interpreted Justice Souter's opinion in Hartford Fire to dis-
count the necessity of comity considerations unless there is a "true conflict"
of law between sovereigns.'9
Just as the courts and enforcement agencies had settled into the Hart-
ford Fire two-part test, the Ninth Circuit reintroduced the Timberlane fac-
tors test." In Metro Industries Inc. v. Sammi Corp.,"' the court applied the
jurisdictional rule of reason to determine whether the court could extend ju-
risdiction to anticompetitive conduct in Korea.22 Writing for the three-judge
panel, Judge Wiggins stated the following: "While HarOford Fire Ins. over-
ruled our holding in Timberlane I" that a foreign government's encourage-
ment of conduct which the United States prohibits would amount to a con-
flict of law, it did not question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of
reason or the seven comity factors set forth in Timberlane I., ' 24 The court
then applied the comity factors from Timberlane I and found jurisdiction
proper. Other circuits have addressed similar questions of the effect of
Hartford Fire on the comity question with varying results.26 Thus, the de-
of international comity. See Chung, supra note 7, at 394 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Brockbank, supra note 5, at 12 ("Justice Souter outlined a rule that all
but did away with the notion of comity."); Chung, supra note 7, at 398 ("[T]he Supreme
Court effectively narrowed the inquiry into the balance of domestic and international inter-
ests."); Varun Gupta, Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEo. L.J. 2287,
2299 (1996) ("Hartford Fire effectively overrules Timberlane .... "); Sumner, supra note
7, at 930 ("The Supreme Court recently rejected the third prong of the Timberlane analyti-
cal framework.").
19. 509 U.S. at 798; see also Brockbank, supra note 5, at 12; Chung, supra note 7, at
398.
20. Timberlane , 549 F.2d at 613-14.
21. 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. Id. at 845-47.
23. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Assoc., 749 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Timberlane II].
24. 82 F.3d at 846 n.5 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 845-47.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co. Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
1997) ("Comity is more an aspiration than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a mat-
ter of obligation. In all events, its growth has been stunted by Hartford Fire."); In re Max-
well Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996) ("International comity
comes into play only when there is a true conflict between American law and that of a for-
eign jurisdiction.").
Prior to the enactment of the FTAIA, subject matter jurisdiction was also an area of un-
certainty for courts adjudicating international antitrust disputes. However, the FTAIA's
two-step test, (1) "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect," and (2) U.S. courts
can obtain jurisdiction, suggests that Congress has conferred subject matter jurisdiction and
that the exercise of jurisdiction relies more on questions of personal jurisdiction and comity
analysis. See Robert Shank, The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy:
Toward a "Positive Comity" Solution to International Competition Problems?, 29 VAND. J.
3
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bate among the circuits remains as intense as it was before Hartford Fire.
Part I of this Comment explores the role of international comity in the
context of Sherman Act enforcement. Part II briefly traces the development
of current tests for asserting antitrust jurisdiction considering international
comity, focusing specifically on the current confusion among the circuits
contrasted with the views of post-Hartford Fire commentators. Part III
probes criticisms of legislative attempts to clarify the jurisdiction federal
courts may exercise in international antitrust enforcement actions. Part IV
reviews the evolution of executive branch antitrust policy in the wake of ju-
dicial and congressional actions. Part V discusses the reaction of the inter-
national community to United States antitrust enforcement efforts. Finally,
Part VI suggests possible resolutions to the current confused state of foreign
antitrust action jurisdiction that may work to realize more consistent, pre-
dictable jurisdictional findings in international antitrust disputes.
I. INTERNATIONAL COMITY CONCERNS: THE DELICATE BALANCE
To avoid the risk of diplomatic and trade repercussions, federal courts
that exercise jurisdiction when enforcing the Sherman Act must consider the
comity of nations. The comity of nations is "the recognition which one na-
tion allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation."' Generally, international law has recognized that a foreign
nation has the authority to "prescribe law with respect to... conduct that,
wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory."28 This principle
is modified by the "effects" doctrine whereby the United States can
"prescribe law with respect to ... conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory." 9 Thus, the laws of a
foreign actor's country of residence as well as the Sherman Act can govern
anticompetitive market conduct abroad.
In the exercise of comity, one nation refrains from enforcement of its
interests.3" Ideally, the sovereign with the greatest interest in the controversy
will be allowed to pursue resolution." But in United States efforts to enforce
TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 172-75 (1996). But see Dam, supra note 6, at 309-10 (discussing the
use of subject matter jurisdiction analysis as opposed to jurisdiction to prescribe in Hart-
ford Fire).
27. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 267 (1990). See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
164 (1895) ("[T]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are un-
der the protection of its laws.").
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF UNITED STATES § 402(l)(a)
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
29. Id. § 402(1)(c).
30. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 n.1 (1982).
31. Gupta, supra note 18, at 2293.
4
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antitrust measures, it is precisely the determination of the sovereign having
the greatest interest which presents the greatest difficulty." Courts struggle
to find consistent methodologies for measuring these interests."
Congress follows uncertainty in the courts with legislation that is meant
to establish guidelines but instead tends to conflict with international law
even more.' For example, in an effort to clarify United States policy re-
garding the extraterritorial reach of antitrust laws, Congress enacted the For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982."5 The Act denies jurisdic-
tion over foreign conduct relating to exports with certain exceptions; but the
Act's exceptions are so broad that the jurisdictional denial is in practice
meaningless."
Meanwhile, in an effort to avoid derailing executive branch foreign
policy, courts and the Congress often hesitate to act extraterritorially at all.
37
Acknowledging the importance of comity among nations, Congress limits
the extraterritorial reach of promulgated laws.38 However, the Constitution
places no prohibitions on Congress extending the reach of enacted law to
govern conduct outside the United States." Should Congress enact a law
whereby a clear intent to legislate extraterritorially is indicated, the courts
must enforce that law even though it conflicts with international law. °
II. FEDERAL COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL COMITY IN ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT: SEARCHING FOR AN ANSWER
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to facilitate protection of the
American consumer in a free and unfettered market economy. The Act's
32. See Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that "there is the addi-
tional question which is unique to the international setting of whether the interests of, and
links to, the United States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign
commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-4-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion
of extraterritorial authority").
33. See Chung, supra note 7, at 399 ('These diverse tests and all their permutations
have created jurisdictional chaos.").
34. See Gupta, supra note 18, at 2297-99.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
36. See Brockbank, supra note 5, at 16; infra Part 1II.
37. David B. Massey, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The
Reasonableness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J.
INTr'L L. 419, 432 (1997).
38. Under the RESTATEMENT (TuIRD), a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with re-
spect to (1) persons, acts, property, or events occurring within its territory; (2) conduct out-
side its territory that has or is intended to have a substantial effect within its territory; (3)
its nationals outside its territory as well as within; and (4) crimes against its security or its
vital economic interests. § 402. Jurisdiction is also limited by the "reasonableness" re-
quirement of § 403.
39. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Congress has the
authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.").
40. Id. at 248 (whether Congress has exercised authority to enforce its law extraterrito-
rially is a matter of statutory construction).
5
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bold proclamation was the following: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal."'"
Since its enactment, judicial, legislative, and executive bodies have
struggled to adopt guidelines that allow consistent, predictable application
of the Act to violations in foreign commerce. 4' As global markets develop43
and free trading blocks" become the order of the modem commercial era,
debate has intensified both domestically and abroad about what the appro-
priate scope of the Act is regarding foreign commerce.45 Additionally, debate
rages on the appropriate forum for enforcing antitrust law against foreign
entities.6
The United States Supreme Court summarized the intent and goals of
the Sherman Act in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest equality, and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservations of our democratic political and social institutions.41
Though detailed in purpose, the Sherman Act failed to establish any
clear guidelines on the limits of enforcement in international antitrust dis-
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
42. "Foreign commerce," as used in this Comment, describes activities associated with
trade or commerce between the United States and foreign parties.
43. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr)-forming the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
44. E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.
(NAFTA); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC TREATY).
45. See Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International Disputes over En-
forcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279 (1982). The American Bar As-
sociation has suggested a system whereby federal agencies would notify the State Depart-
ment two weeks before taking any action carrying potentially serious issues of international
comity. Id. at 292-93. Professor Griffin further notes that, for every declaration of diplo-
matic support, there have been five diplomatic protests of United States antitrust cases. Id.
at 282. See also Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Anti-
trust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 274 (1982) (suggesting that agencies issue formal
statements or appearances at request of foreign parties); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 re-
porter's note 1 (citing examples of European states questioning applications of U.S. juris-
diction as "exorbitant").
46. See, e.g., Roscoe B. Starek, Ill, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforce-
ment and Other International Antitrust Developments, text of prepared remarks for delivery
during the "Antitrust 1997" Conference in Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 1996, available in
1996 WL 683123; Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J.
INT'LL. 1 (1997).
47. 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
6
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putes."8 Since the Act's enactment, courts have struggled with determining
just where jurisdiction begins and ends when foreign commerce is involved.
The result is a hodgepodge of judicially constructed tests and factors.4 '9 Both
the Supreme Court and circuit courts have attempted for over one hundred
years to develop a mechanical process for determining when they have ju-
risdiction over foreign antitrust disputes, only to confuse the demarcation
hopelessly."
A. Expanding the Reach of the Sherman Act
For much of the early history of Sherman Act enforcement, the courts
took the view that Congress had not intended to extend its reach extraterrito-
rially. In the 1909 decision of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,"
the Supreme Court determined that antitrust laws do not extend outside the
borders of the United States because Congress did not clearly indicate an
intent to apply the Act extraterritorially.52 However, when the Court applied
this view to the facts presented in American Banana, the first signs of judi-
cial confusion about how to analyze international antitrust disputes became
apparent. The American Banana Court looked only to direct actions taken in
Costa Rica, ignoring any strategic activity taken in the United States by the
Alabama-based defendant.53 In that case, the plaintiff American corporation
was attempting to cultivate fruit in Costa Rica for export to the United
States. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, also an American corpora-
tion holding a virtual monopoly in the trade, had engaged in anticompetitive
practices in violation of the Sherman Act, including instigating Costa Rican
army seizures of plaintiff' s property and new railway.54
At that time, the international view was that a nation had exclusive soy-
48. Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, 1 ANTITRUST LAw § 109b, at 22-23 (1978).
See also Henry C. Pitney, Note, Sovereign Compulsion and International Antitrust: Con-
flicting Laws and Separating Powers, 25 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 406 (1987) (noting
"great uncertainty" as to extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act). But see Barry E. Hawk,
The Sherman Act: The Second Century, 59 ANTIrRUST L.J. 161 (1990) ("[L]egislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act evidences a clear intent to prohibit foreign cartels."); Dale J.
Montpelier, Diamonds Are Forever? Implications of the United States Antitrust Statutes on
International Trade and the De Beers Diamond Cartel, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 277, 280
(1994) ("Act condemns anticompetitive behavior by foreign companies dealing in Ameri-
can markets."); James R. Atwood & Kingman Brewster, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BusINEss ABROAD §§ 2:2-2:3, at 22-26 (3d ed. 1997) (asserting that plain language of the
Act and legislative history evidences congressional intent to regulate imports with the
Sherman Act).
49. See Chung, supra note 7, at 399.
50. Id.
51. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
52. Id. at 357 ("[I]n case of doubt.., any statute [should be interpreted] to be con-
fined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has gen-
eral and legitimate power.").
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ereignty and jurisdiction within its own boundaries. 5 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Holmes voiced skepticism over the idea of extending the Court's
reach to adjudicate acts occurring outside the United States.56 An additional
complication facing the Court and mitigating against extending jurisdiction
was the legal status of the defendant's acts under the laws of Costa Rica."
The Court determined that any action taken in United States courts would
interfere with the authority of another sovereign's freedom to regulate com-
merce as it saw fit." The Court refused to extend jurisdiction to reach the
activity."
This precedent was followed until 1945 when Judge Learned Hand
wrote for the majority in ALCOA.6 0 With that opinion, jurisdictional uncer-
tainty was introduced into the courts and has remained constant ever since.6
In ALCOA, the United States filed a complaint alleging an anticompetitive
cartel between foreign corporations from Great Britain, Germany, Switzer-
land, and Canada.6" Specifically, the United States government alleged that
"Limited," a Canadian corporation established by ALCOA to assume its
foreign properties, was part of a foreign cartel intending to fix a quota on
aluminum imported to the United States.63 The issue before the court was
whether Congress intended antitrust liability to attach to a foreign entity al-
legedly engaged in anticompetitive conduct outside the United States.'
Harmonizing antitrust jurisdiction with international law developments,65
Judge Hand created the "intended effects test" by asserting: "[I]t is settled
55. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law,
1991 Sup. Or. REV. 179,186 (1992).
56. 213 U.S. at 355.
57. Id. at 356. The Court concluded the following:
But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act
is done. . . . For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor,
to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he
did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the
authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other
state concerned justly might resent.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 359.
60. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In ALCOA, an agreement formed outside the United
States between a Canadian company and a European aluminum producer attempted to limit
aluminum ingot imports into the United States. Id. at 439-41.
61. See Barry E. Hawk, 1 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 13 (1989 Supp.) ("Criticism focused on three related
concerns: 1) jurisdictional overbreadth and lack of sensitivity to foreign interests; 2) un-
certainty of the substantive rules; and 3) adverse impact on U.S. firms.").
62. 148 F.2d at 442.
63. Id. at 439, 442.
64. Id. at 443.
65. Kramer, supra note 55, at 192-93.
8
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law.., that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will
ordinarily recognize. ' '
After ALCOA, courts and enforcement agencies began the task of at-
tempting to give meaning to the term "intended effects." 7 The ALCOA court
gave no guidelines for what severity of effect was required. 8 While the tests
used to measure these "effects" vary depending upon which court or en-
forcement agency is investigating the alleged illegality, 9 results have been
consistent." Also, enforcement agencies and the courts have differed in in-
terpretations of the "intent" required."
66. 148 F.2d at 443.
67. See, e.g., Timberlane , 549 F.2d 597, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that "some
effect-actual or intended--on American foreign commerce" must exist; effect must be
"sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs"); ANTITRUST DIVISION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
6-7 (1977) (requiring substantial effect on commerce of United States) [hereinafter 1977
GUIDELINES].
68. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 444-45.
69. See, e.g., Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 612-13 (holding that "some effect-actual or
intended-on American foreign commerce" must exist; effect must be "sufficiently large to
present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs"); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[I]t is probably not necessary for the
effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not de mini-
mus."); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (conduct must "directly affect the flow of foreign commerce into or out of this
country"); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,600, 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (conduct must have "substantial and material effect upon
our foreign and domestic commerce"), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D.
Ohio 1949) (conduct must have "a direct and influencing effect on trade ... between the
United States and foreign countries"), modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (conduct must have "deleteriously af-
fected [United States] commerce"); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513,
527 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (conduct must have "suppress[ed] imports into and exports from the
United States"), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 6-7
(requiring substantial effect on U.S. commerce).
70. See House Comm. on the Judiciary, Legislative History of the Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 1982, H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982)
[hereinafter Legislative History]. "[Diespite the variations in wording, 'there is, with rare
exception, no significant inconsistency between judicial precedents and the Justice Depart-
ment's view of the effects test."' Id. (quoting Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar
Ass'n, Report to Accompany Resolutions Concerning Legislative Proposals to Promote Ex-
port Trading 22 (1981)); cf Timberlane L 549 F.2d at 611 ("Nor is it quite clear what the
'direct-indirect' distinction is supposed to mean.").
71. See, e.g., 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 6-7 (foreseeable effect on U.S. com-
merce required); Zenith Radio Corp v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161,
1189 & n.65 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (requires general intent to affect U.S. commerce; deemed to
intend natural consequences of acts); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd.,
285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (no intent required).
9
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B. Limitations on the Effects Test
In its wake, the ALCOA court left the "intended effects test."72 This
measuring device for extending jurisdiction hinged on whether the foreign
conduct was meant to produce or did produce a substantial effect in the
United States.7' The broad possibilities of applying the effects test prompted
defendants to search for defenses based on comity limits. In Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp. v. Butte Gas & Oil Co., the defendant successfully used the
act of state doctrine to avoid United States jurisdiction over an antitrust
claim against it.74 This doctrine, first espoused in Underhill v. Hernandez,"'
had developed to bar United States courts from sitting in judgment of acts
taken by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.76 The plaintiff in Occi-
dental Petroleum alleged that the defendants conspired with an Arab sheik-
dom to misappropriate offshore waters previously granted to Occidental.
Specifically, Occidental claimed that the defendant had coerced a sheikdom
to issue a decree claiming the offshore waters in which Occidental had
rights.7' Since the court could not sit in judgment of the sovereign's act of
claiming ownership of the waters, the defendant could not be adjudicated
under the antitrust laws.7" Thus, the act of state doctrine can limit antitrust
complaints hinging upon the anticompetitive acts committed by sover-
eigns."9
In recent years, courts have narrowed the applicability of the act of state
doctrine to antitrust actions. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court held that, though prompted by an official Mexican
decree, there was no bar to jurisdiction available to shield the defendant's
conduct via the act of state doctrine."0 The Court based its decision on facts
72. 148 F.2d 416, 444-45. The ALCOA court found that, once the United States had
proved intent to affect imports, the burden shifted to the defendants to show that the
agreement had no effect. Id. at 445.
73. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("[I]t is well estab-
lished by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.").
74. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curium, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).
75. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Prior to invocation by antitrust defendants, the doctrine had
been exercised in actions over Cuban nationalizations of property belonging to U.S. citi-
zens and companies following the Cuban revolution. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
76. Occidental Petroleum, 331 F. Supp. at 108 (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
77. Id. at 99-101.
78. Id. at 108.
79. Id. at 109-10. See also International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 568-69 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that OPEC was not subject to
United States antitrust jurisdiction because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and "act
of government" doctrine precluded assertion of jurisdictional authority), aff'd, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cit. 1981).
80. 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927).
10
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showing that the defendant had initiated the conspiracy from within the
United States and had actively lobbied the Mexican government to make the
decree the defendant was claiming had prompted the defendant's conduct.8
The Court reaffirmed its decision years later in Continental Ore Co. v. Un-
ion Carbide and Carbon Corp. ,82 stating that a sovereign's mere approval of
the defendant's actions did not invoke the act of state doctrine.83 Since Con-
tinental Ore, American courts have rarely found that foreign interests and
policies rise to the level of an official act of state."
A second comity-based defense to antitrust actions brought in American
courts is that of sovereign compulsion. Considered a derivative of the act of
state doctrine,85 the party asserting the defense must show that a foreign
government is compelling it to engage in the questioned conduct, thus not
being liable under the laws of another nation for that conduct.86 In In-
teramerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,' the plaintiffs alleged
that Texaco Maracaibo conspired to refuse oil sales to Interamerican.88 The
defendants claimed that the refusal to sell was not the product of anticom-
petitive conspiracy, but instead stemmed from the government of Vene-
zuela's oil boycott, prohibiting the defendants from selling oil to Interameri-
can." A United States district court agreed, holding that "[w]hen a nation
compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts of
business become effectively acts of sovereign."9 The defendant was found
not to be subject to United States antitrust jurisdiction.9
81. Id. at 276.
82. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
83. Id. See also Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. The Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
694-95 (1976) (holding that the key inquiry is the level of government involvement in the
specific acts alleged. If alleged activity was independent of government involvement, act of
state doctrine does not act as a bar to jurisdiction.).
84. Chung, supra note 7, at 388.
85. Cf. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that sovereign
compulsion is a "corollary" of the act of state).
86. Pitney, supra note 48, at 403. Another possible defense to exercise of jurisdiction
is the doctrine of forum non conveniens, allowing the dismissal of a case if there is
"oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant.., out of all proportion to plaintiff's conven-
ience," or "when the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting
the court's own administration and legal problems." Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
241 (1981) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
87. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
88. Id. at 1292.
89. Id. at 1293.
90. Id. at 1298.
91. Id. However, a finding of sovereign compulsion requires specific proof of compul-
sion. If a foreign nation issued a decree to a defendant, but did not require that party to en-
gage in a certain course of conduct, then the activity would not rise to sovereign compul-
sion. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr. Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,600, at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (noting that, if defendant's activities were
required under foreign law, United States court has no right to condemn activities), order
modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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Though still recognized, the sovereign compulsion doctrine has not
constituted a significant limiting factor to United States jurisdiction over
international antitrust disputes.9" The Supreme Court has considered the de-
fense only once, in Continental Ore, where it found that the defense did not
apply. 3 Additionally, courts have required that the sovereign must force the
defendant's action. The defendant cannot have had any legal option to refuse
taking the action compelled by the sovereign; otherwise the defense is un-
available.9" Consequently, the strict compulsion requirement has limited the
use of this defense.95
C. Recent Developments and Confusion in the Courts
Courts managed consistent results in the exercise of jurisdiction while
applying different methodologies before the Ninth Circuit decided Timber-
lane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America96 in 1976. In Timberlane I, the Ninth
Circuit held that exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust actions
should always be reasonable.9 7 To that end, the court balanced a series of
comity factors to determine whether United States court jurisdiction was
reasonable considering prescriptive comity.98
Timberlane's main allegation was that the Bank of America had con-
spired with the Honduran government and several Honduran corporations to
eliminate it from the Honduran lumber export business." Specifically, Tim-
berlane contended that the Bank of America had conspired unlawfully to
subordinate its property interests in a milling plant located in Honduras that
Timberlane was acquiring to produce lumber.00 Bank of America assigned
the mill interests to a co-conspirator, who enforced court-ordered attachment
92. Pitney, supra note 48, at 411-14 (contending that (1) courts fear that regular dis-
missals pursuant to sovereign compulsion would leave a large loophole in U.S. antitrust
law; (2) courts are suspicious of compulsion allegations especially when the government
action confers a benefit on the defendant; and (3) there is no reason to apply sovereign
compulsion doctrine when the government's action appears illegal under its own laws).
93. See Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 707 (finding that defendant is not afforded sover-
eign compulsion defense in antitrust action when Canadian law did not compel discrimi-
natory pricing).
94. Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The
defense [of sovereign compulsion] is not available if the defendant could have legally re-
fused to accede to the foreign power's wishes.").
95. Pitney, supra note 48, at 412.
96. Timberlane , 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
97. Id. at 613.
98. Id. at 614. Prescriptive comity, as used by Justice Scalia in his Hartford Fire dis-
sent, is the "respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws."
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993).
99. 549 F.2d at 604.
100. Id. Timberlane was attempting to purchase a milling plant previously owned by
the Lima family, who had experienced financial difficulties in 1971. During the process of
acquisition, the family transferred interests in the operation to its creditors, all of whom
were ultimately in debt to Bank of America. Id.
12
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of the property."' In addition, the appointed "intervenor," a court-appointed
officer assigned to prevent loss in property value, used Honduran troops to
shut down the mill. 2 Uneasy with the inconsistencies of effects-based juris-
dictional determinations,0 3 the Timberlane court set forth a three-part test
for determining jurisdictional power.'04 First, Sherman Act jurisdiction re-
quires an intended or actual effect on American foreign commerce." 5 Sec-
ond, the plaintiff must show that a cognizable injury exists to which United
States antitrust laws should apply. 6 Third, there must be an inquiry into
factors expressing international comity concerns, including
1. the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. the nationality or allegiance of the parties;
3. the locations or principal places of business of corporations;
4. the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance;
5. the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere;
6. the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce;
7. the foreseeability of such effect; and
8. the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 7
This third prong, entitled the "jurisdictional rule of reason," 1 8 was an at-
tempt to reconcile domestic and foreign interests.'0 '
Timberlane was the first meaningful attempt to create a rule of United
States antitrust jurisdiction that took international concerns fully into ac-
count."0 However, the difficulty of applying a test calling for analysis of
complex domestic and international concerns resulted in greater confusion
101. Id. The Honduran attachment was known as an "embargo." Under Honduran law,
an "embargo" is a court-ordered attachment on the property, registered with the Public
Registry, precluding the sale of the property without court order. Id.
102. Id. at 604-05.
103. Id. at 611. The Ninth Circuit recognized that, even among American courts, there
is no consensus on how far or under what rationale jurisdiction should extend. This is evi-
denced by the various permutations of the "effects test" in case law. See, e.g., Occidental
Petroleum, 331 F. Supp. at 102-03 (advocating "direct or substantial effects" test), aff'd,
461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr.,
Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (advocating "direct
and substantial effects" test), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 71,352 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
104. 549 F.2d at 613.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 614 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED
STATES § 40 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]).
108. Id. at 613.
109. Id. at 611.
110. See Chung, supra note 7, at 394.
19981 437
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about when the exercise of jurisdiction was proper."' This confusion in the
courts after Timberlane I led to a resurgence of the effects doctrine."'
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,"' the Third Circuit held
that jurisdiction may be justified solely by finding intended effects in the
United States, but that the court could decline jurisdiction if it found com-
pelling international interests."' The Mannington court found that the defen-
dant's alleged attempts to defraud patent authorities were intended to affect
United States Foreign commerce, thereby justifying jurisdiction under
ALCOA's intended effects test alone."5 However, the court then remanded
the case, after justifying jurisdiction via the intended effects test, by using a
Timberlane-type test to evaluate international interests."
6
The difficulty of consistent application of the jurisdictional rule of rea-
son was not limited to Mannington. In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,"7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also returned to
the ALCOA intended effects test, noting mistrust of the jurisdictional rule of
reason in doing so."' The Laker court justified exercising jurisdiction over
111. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 948-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(suggesting that balancing test would require enormous discovery, including production of
political policy papers); see also Griffin, supra note 45, at 295-97 (1982) (stating that
"American and foreign judges... question the competence of judges to evaluate the dip-
lomatic, national security, and international economic issues raised by the factors [of the
Timberlane I test]" and forecasting that more court use of the jurisdictional rule of reason is
likely to produce inconsistent definitions and application).
112. See Chung, supra note 7, at 394; see also Allison J. Himelfarb, The International
Language of Convergence: Reviving Antitrust Dialogue Between the United States and the
European Union with a Uniform Understanding of "Extraterritoriality," 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 909, 924 (1996).
113. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
114. Id. at 1296-98. In Mannington Mills, the court confronted an allegation of
fraudulently secured patents, which, if true, would subject the defendant to Sherman Act
liability. Id. at 1290. The plaintiff asserted that Congoleum had made material misrepre-
sentations to foreign patent authorities regarding the performance and specifications of its
vinyl floor covering. Id. Mannington further alleged that Congoleum threatened to enforce
its fraudulent patents by maintaining frivolous infringement suits in the foreign countries, a
threat which Congoleum followed through on in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Ja-
pan. Id.
115. Id. at 1291-92.
116. Id. at 1297.
117. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
118. Id. at 922, 948. In Laker, a British airline filed an antitrust action against several
domestic and foreign competitors alleging a concerted conspiracy to drive Laker out of the
airline industry. Id. at 916. Laker alleged that members of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) conspired to fix fares for transatlantic flights at a predatory level to
erode Laker's clientele, and thereafter to raise fares when Laker was run out. Id. Laker also
claimed that the defendants interfered with its attempts to restructure its debt and to con-
tinue operations. Id. In the complicated procedural history, the British defendants re-
sponded to the original Laker complaint by seeking injunctions from the High Court of
Justice of the United Kingdom to prohibit Laker from instituting an antitrust action in a
United States district court. Id. at 915. The British defendants successfully obtained tempo-
rary injunctions against Laker. Id. at 918. To counter, Laker filed a motion for preliminary
14
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the defendants, alleged to have participated in an international conspiracy to
eliminate Laker Airways from the no-frills segment of the airline industry,
on the basis of concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction."9 The court relied on
principles of territoriality as a foundation for jurisdiction, reasoning that a
state has the right to control and regulate activities occurring within its bor-
ders. 2 ' The court then found that, as a consequence of territorial jurisdiction,
conduct outside a state's boundaries intended to have or having substantial
effect within those boundaries may be regulated by the affected state as
well.'
In finding jurisdiction by essentially using the intended effects test, the
Laker court used a significant part of its opinion to argue that jurisdiction
based on effects is not asserting jurisdiction extraterritorially"' The court
held that a foreign entity doing business in the United States should expect
to be subject to United States antitrust law for conduct affecting domestic
commerce.' The court further held that, even if some of the conduct oc-
curred outside the United States, the entire transaction would still be subject
to United States court scrutiny because of the effects intended within.'24 Ad-
ditionally, the court expressly voiced its skepticism of the jurisdictional rule
of reason.'25 Citing decisions from the Second and Seventh Circuits rejecting
the rule of reason,'26 the court expressed doubt about the ability of the judi-
ciary to weigh international political interests as required by the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason.IV
In 1993, with the circuits split, the Supreme Court confronted the issue
injunction in the district court to prevent the remaining defendants from instituting similar
actions in British courts. Id. at 918-19. Laker's motion was granted, and KLM and Sabena
appealed.
119. Id. at 917, 921-22. Prescriptive jurisdiction in the international context is exer-
cised when a state prescribes rules of conduct reaching outside its territory that are binding
on a foreign party. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 (state has jurisdiction over parties, or
parties with interests, within state's territory).
120. Id. at 922.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 923.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 948.
126. National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981); In
re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1978). In addition, two
years after the Laker decision, the Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed the effects doctrine
in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 n.6 (1986).
127. Laker, 731 F.2d at 948. Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkey questioned the
validity of the balancing test on four counts: (1) It is almost impossible to balance interests
when a court has to weigh domestic interests versus foreign law specifically calculated to
thwart those domestic interests; (2) the judiciary is not the proper forum for balancing in-
terests, as it is limited in its ability to make a well-reasoned analysis of complicated inter-
national policy initiatives; (3) the adoption of balancing of interests does not necessarily
promote comity; and (4) the additional considerations in the jurisdictional rule of reason
are unlikely to advance conflict resolution. Id. at 948-49.
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of extending Sherman Act jurisdiction over international parties in Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California."8 The Court reaffirmed the effects test
and, according to most commentators, relegated the jurisdictional rule of
reason to obscurity.' 9
In Hartford Fire, nineteen states and various private parties filed suit
against several domestic insurers and a group of London reinsurers, alleging
an international conspiracy to restrict the commercial insurance market.'30
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the London reinsurers had entered
into agreements, primarily in London, to limit coverage terms on commer-
cial insurance policies, effectively limiting the types of insurance coverage
available in the United States.' Because the conduct at issue, the agree-
ments between the reinsurers and insurers, took place primarily in London,
the Court had to consider whether principles of international comity cau-
tioned against exercising jurisdiction over the London-based reinsurers.'
Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, a California district court applying
the Timberlane I tripartite analysis, including the jurisdictional rule of rea-
son, had dismissed the case on the ground that international comity pre-
cluded exercising jurisdiction.' The Ninth Circuit found that the Sherman
Act was in conflict with British law as to the agreements,'" but reversed af-
ter further finding that the remaining factors demanded the exercise of juris-
diction."3 5
The Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 vote that included a vigorous dis-
sent by Justice Scalia on the Court's comity analysis, 3 6 affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's finding that exercise of jurisdiction was proper. 7 However, the
Court relied on a different analysis in reaching this conclusion.' The Court
reaffirmed the ALCOA effects test, stating that "[iut is now well established
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."'3 In
declining to engage in comity analysis, the Court rendered what commenta-
tors have characterized as a substantial limitation to application of the juris-
128. 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993).
129. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
130. 509 U.S. at 774-76. Reinsurers provide coverage to primary insurers that allows
insurance companies to avoid bearing all of a given risk themselves. The ability to share
this risk allows primary insurers to take on more risk while maintaining reserves of funds
for claims payment, as usually mandated by state insurance laws.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 795-76.
133. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 487-90 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
134. This is the first factor requiring consideration under the Timberlane I test. 549
F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976).
135. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 934 (9th Cir. 1991).
136. 509 U.S. at 800.
137. Id. at 799.
138. Id. at 796.
139. Id.
16
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dictional rule of reason:4' Absent a conflict of law between the United
States and the state of the foreign actor, balancing comity issues is unneces-
sary. 4' In so doing, the Court effectively limited consideration of comity to
those approximating the problems giving rise to the act of state or sovereign
compulsion defenses,'42 namely whether the "person subject to regulation by
two states can comply with the laws of both.'
43
In his dissent, Justice Scalia referenced several circuit court cases, in-
cluding Timberlane and Mannington, for support of his contention that in-
ternational comity consideration was proper when attempting to extend en-
forcement of the Sherman Act extraterritorially.'" The dissent drew
additional support from the Restatement (Third), which had adopted comity
consideration factors paralleling those of Timberlane's jurisdictional rule of
reason.' 41 Justice Scalia argued that "a nation having some 'basis' for juris-
diction to prescribe law should nonetheless refrain from exercising that ju-
risdiction 'with respect to a person or activity having connections with an-
other state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. '"14 6 In
applying the Restatement's factors, the dissent contended that United States
law should not be applied in light of international comity."7
After Hartford Fire, the course for federal courts seemed clear. 48 First,
courts should look to whether the foreign conduct was intended to produce,
and in fact did produce, some substantial effect in the United States. 149 Sec-
ond, if the effects test is satisfied, principles of international comity should
be considered only if "there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and
140. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
141. 509 U.S. at 795-96.
142. See discussion of judicial tests supra Part ll.B.
143. 509 U.S. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403, cmt. e).
144. Id. at 817.
145. Id. at 818-19.
146. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(1)). The "reasonableness" inquiry turns
on five primary (but not exclusive) factors, including 1) the extent to which the activity
takes place in the United States, RESTATEMENT (TmRD) § 403(2)(a); 2) the connections
"between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated," such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, id. at § 403(2)(b); 3) "the
character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state,
the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desir-
ability of such regulation is generally accepted," id. at § 403(2)(c); 4) "the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity," id. at § 403(2)(d); and 5) "the
likelihood of a conflict with regulation by another state." Id. at § 403(2)(e).
147. 509 U.S. at 819 ("Rarely would these factors point more clearly against applica-
tion of United States law"). But see Massey, supra note 37, for a thorough analysis of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) international comity statements, arguing that it did not represent the
state of international comity law, but rather, was a statement of what the commentators
thought the law should be.
148. See, e.g., Brockbank, supra note 5, at 15; United States v. Nippon Paper Indus.
Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction valid as conduct had sub-
stantial and intended effect within the United States).
149. 509 U.S. at 798.
1998]
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foreign law."' °
D. The Rebirth of Timberlane I: More Uncertainty in the Circuits
Though the test established by Hartford Fire seemed clear to commen-
tators, 5 ' the Ninth Circuit was not convinced. Following Hartford Fire, the
Ninth Circuit in Metro Indus. v. Sammi Corp. had the opportunity to address
the issue of what role international comity considerations play in determin-
ing extraterritorial extension of the Sherman Act.'
52
In Metro, an importer and wholesaler of kitchenware sued a foreign ex-
port company, along with two of its domestic subsidiaries.'53 Metro had sup-
plied the Korean distributor with models of a new stainless steel steamer,
requesting that Sammi develop samples and prepare to supply the steam-
ers. 4 Sammi registered the design with the Korean Holloware Association
and began to supply Metro with steamers.'55 The association granted regis-
tration rights for patterns and designs of particular products based on shape,
appearance, and color of the product. 56 Registration gave the design holder
the exclusive right to export a particular design for three years, with a right
to extend the registration."'
Two years into the export arrangement, Metro experienced disruptions
in deliveries from Sammi.'58 Metro alleged that (1) Sammi blocked its at-
tempts to secure steamers from other Korean sources by using the registra-
tion system and (2) the Korean design registration system constituted market
division that was a per se violation of the Sherman Act."59 The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant. 6 '
Though upholding a grant of summary judgment by the district court,'6'
the Ninth Circuit held that the Timberlane P62 comity analysis factors were
still appropriate, Hartford Fire notwithstanding. 63 In a footnote to the
court's jurisdictional rule of reason analysis in Metro, the court stated the
following: "While Hartford Fire Ins. overruled our holding in Timberlane
II'" that a foreign government's encouragement of conduct which the United
150. Id.
151. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
152. 82 F.3d 839 (1996).






159. Id. at 841.
160. Id. at 842.
161. Id. at 849.
162. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
163. 82 F.3d at 846 n.5.
164. 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
18
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States prohibits would amount to a conflict of law, it did not question the
propriety of the jurisdictional rule of reason or the seven comity factors set
forth in Timberlane L' ',16 After finding that comity considerations under the
Timberlane I test did not compel declining jurisdiction, the court affirmed
the district court's decision because Metro could not show an antitrust in-
jury.166
The rule for extending the Sherman Act extraterritorially in the First
Circuit follows Hartford Fire. In United States v. Nippon Paper Industries
Co.,'67 the First Circuit allowed extension of jurisdiction because the defen-
dant's activities, though committed abroad, had a substantial and intended
effect on the United States. 8 There, the government charged the defendant
Japanese company with agreeing to fix the price of thermal fax paper
throughout North America.'69 In denying the defendant's appeal to interna-
tional comity, the court said the following: "[Clomity is more an aspiration
than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of obligation. In all





The Second Circuit recognizes yet another variation of the rule from
Hartford Fire. There, the court in In re Maxwell 7' cited Hartford Fire for
the principle that "[i]nternational comity comes into play only when there is
a true conflict between American law and that of a foreign jurisdiction.' 72
After finding a true conflict between British and American law, Judge Car-
damone continued the opinion with a Timberlane-type analysis, reaching the
conclusion that international comity concerns precluded application of
American law." Though Maxwell concerned an action in bankruptcy, at
least one district court in the Second Circuit has read the opinion as estab-
lishing a threshold requirement of true conflict in antitrust actions involving
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom,74 Judge Haight examined the
165. 82 F.3d at 846 n.5.
166. Id. at 848.
167. 109 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1997).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 8.
171. 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1994). In Maxwell, the death of British media magnate
Robert Maxwell and the ensuing bankruptcy of his British corporation resulted in the bank-
ruptcy court initiating adversarial proceedings against British and French banks. The action
brought British law in conflict with American avoidance laws. Id. at 1054-55.
172. Id. at 1049 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798
(1993)).
173. Id. at 1054-55.
174. 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Filetech involved the limitation by French law
of the release of telephone information, namely no-call solicitation lists, to other phone di-
rectory providers. Calling a party listed on the no-call list was a violation of French law;
however, lists released by the primary government-contracted phone company did not
specify who had requested to be on this list. Thus, the directory listings were not saleable to
1998]
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various tests of the circuits since Hartford Fire.'7 He determined that, in the
Second Circuit, "a party seeking dismissal of a Sherman Act case on ground
of international comity must first demonstrate that a true conflict exists be-
tween the Sherman Act and relevant foreign law."' 7' He viewed the Second
Circuit's rationale in Maxwell as establishing identification of "a true con-
flict of law as the threshold requirement, the condition precedent, the sine
qua non of any international comity analysis."'" Judge Haight determined
that, once this threshold barrier is passed, comity analysis in the Second Cir-
cuit follows the same factors as Timberlane I and the Restatement (Third).'78
Each circuit has viewed the holding of Harford Fire as establishing a
different role for concerns of international comity. After reinstituting the
Timberlane I factor test, the Ninth Circuit now considers international com-
ity in all antitrust cases involving foreign conduct. 79 The First Circuit inter-
prets Harford Fire as reestablishing the intended effects test and allowing
consideration of international comity only in situations approximating those
similar to the act of state defense.' In essence, a foreign sovereign must re-
quire the defendant to act in a manner incompatible with the Sherman Act
where compliance with both is impossible.' 8' In the Second Circuit, the
threshold requirement of having a true conflict between the law of the
United States and the law of a foreign sovereign must be fulfilled to allow
consideration of international comity."' Thus, even after Hartford Fire, re-
suits of an action claiming violation of the Sherman Act by a foreign actor
may depend in large part on the circuit chosen. As the international commu-
nity moves towards breaking down trade barriers to foster a more global
economy, this variation in jurisdictional tests may place United States trad-
ing interests at a disadvantage. Foreign states have reacted to jurisdictional
uncertainty by enacting legislation that provides certainty for their own
trading interests by stifling American antitrust enforcement efforts.' 3
marketing companies due to the risk of violating French law by calling a party on the no-
call list. The United States subsidiary of a French directory publisher filed suit to gain ac-
cess to the no-call list, claiming monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at
467-70.
175. Id. at 472-77.
176. Id. at 478.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 481-82. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) section 403(2) parallels the Timberlane
I factors. The factors in Timberlane I were drawn from the RESTATEMENT's prior edition.
See Timberlane I, 549 F.2d 597, 614 n.31 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing section 40 of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) as a source of the factors to be considered in applying a jurisdictional
rule of reason to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases).
179. See, e.g., Metro Indus. v. Sammi Corp, 82 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1996).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
1997).
181. Id.
182. Filetech, 978 F. Supp. at 478.
183. See infra footnotes 235-44 and accompanying text. Foreign states have enacted
legislation to block discovery efforts, reclaim damage awards, and allow courts to decline
20
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III. CONGRESSIONAL ATrEMPTS TO STRUCTURE THE DEBATE
In recent years, Congress has attempted to legislate guidelines for anti-
trust enforcement in the foreign commerce arena. The Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvement Act of 1982 ("FTAIA")" and the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 ("IAEAA") are two examples of this
effort. Unfortunately, these efforts have made the landscape of international
enforcement less clear. The statutes have created more variations to the judi-
cial determination of jurisdiction. The question that arises is, who makes the
determination, the enforcement agency bringing the action or the judici-
ary?186
The FTAIA was enacted to clarify the test for determining United States
antitrust jurisdiction over international commerce.'" The resulting test pri-
marily protects American consumers and exporters rather than protecting
foreign consumers or producers."' Congress narrowly tailored the FTAIA to
maintain the judicial flexibility of the comity doctrine in light of the then
recent Timberlane I jurisdictional rule of reason.89 In drafting the legisla-
tion, Congress included the following:
[T]he bill is intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judi-
to enforce judgments by U.S. courts.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994). Section 6(a) provides, in relevant part, that
[United States antitrust law] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless:
such conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign na-
tions, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person en-
gaged in such trade or commerce in the United States;(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions or this Act other than
this section.
If [the Sherman Act] appl[ies] to such conduct only because of... paragraph
(1)(B), then [the Sherman Act) shall apply to such conduct only for injury to
export business in the United States.
185. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6201-12 (Supp. 1995).
186. See Chung, supra note 7, at 403-08.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a).
188. See Legislative History, supra note 70, at 2 ("Some observers raised questions
about the status of import transactions under H.R. 2326 and urged the Subcommittee to
make clear that the legislation had no effect on the application of antitrust laws to im-
ports.... To remove any possible doubt, the Subcommittee amendment (H.R. 5235, as in-
troduced) modified the legislation to make clear that it applied only to 'export' trade .... It
is thus clear that wholly foreign transactions as well as export transactions are covered by
the amendment, but that import transactions are not.").
189. Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comity, and the Extraterritorial
Reach of United States Antitrust Laws, 29 TEx. INT'L L.J. 159, 160, 199 (1994).
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cial recognition of the special international characteristics of transac-
tions. If a court determines that the requirements for the subject matter
jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts' ability
to employ notions of comity.. . or otherwise to take account of the in-
ternational character of the transaction. 90
Thus, the Act provides no clarification of when to invoke jurisdiction
for antitrust violations by an importer, leaving the current judicial tests in
full effect. 9'
As a response to foreign states blocking discovery requests, Congress in
1994 enacted the IAEAA to facilitate discovery of evidence in antitrust ac-
tions internationally.' The statute authorizes the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission to provide evidence of antitrust violations to
foreign states on a reciprocal basis.'93 Under the Act, the Attorney General
and the Federal Trade Commission can join the United States with foreign
nations in binding, bilateral agreements to provide for the exchange of dis-
covery in antitrust actions. Prior to congressional action, the concept of bi-
lateral discovery agreements had been tested with Canada, Australia, and
Germany. 94 The United States had already entered into a discovery ex-
change agreement with Canada,'95 gaining access to discovery materials, and
resulting in the successful prosecution of a Japanese company for antitrust
violations. 6
190. Legislative History, supra note 70, at 10 (citations omitted).
191. Gupta, supra note 18, at 2297.
192. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6201-12. See 140 Cong. Rec. S15021 (1994) (statement of Senator
Thurmond) ("It is appropriate and necessary for our antitrust authorities to be given better
tools for obtaining evidence abroad, because antitrust violations increasingly involve trans-
actions and evidence which are located abroad or in more than one country."); House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Legislative History of the International Antitrust Enforcement As-
sistance Act H.R. Rep. No. 772, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994) (stating that purpose of
IAEAA was to enhance antitrust enforcement). The House Report quoted testimony of for-
mer Assistant Attorney James F. Rill: "In some circumstances where we had every reason
to believe that a violation might be occurring that was restricting U.S. exports ... we were
not able to take effective action because the evidence was extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, very time consuming to obtain." Id. at 12.
193. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of July 19, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994).
194. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United
States of America and Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Re-
spect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, reprinted in 46 ANTrrRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1156, at 560 (Mar. 15, 1984) (cooperative antitrust agreement); Can-
ada-United States: Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1092 (agreement for the exchange of antitrust discovery). See also Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia
Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, reprinted in 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1071, at 36 (July 1, 1982) (cooperative antitrust agreement).
195. Id.
196. See Tokyo Fax Paper Firms Settle Division Price Fixing Charges, 69 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1732 at 399 (Oct. 5, 1995) (noting that, in United States v.
Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc., cooperation between United States and Canada led to
22
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Though the IAEAA contributes to discovery in pursuit of prosecuting
antitrust conduct on an international scale, it may also add to the confusion
of extraterritorial jurisdiction determination. Under section 6203, a federal
district court can issue an order for discovery on request of the Attorney
General. 7 The Attorney General would make the request for a foreign state
seeking to gain discovery from sources within the United States.'98 In so
doing, the bilateral agreement would allow the Attorney General to make the
same request of a foreign state.'99 This ability to request discovery materials
from foreign states without a court order is a change from the prior require-
ment that discovery production orders should be issued only by a court of
competent jurisdiction after the enforcement authority files a complaint and
after the court has made a threshold jurisdictional inquiry."' Under the
IAEAA, discovery production orders may issue simply by an antitrust en-
forcement authority applying to a district court under the terms of a bilateral
agreement. This change clouds the jurisdictional question further by making
it unclear as to whether the enforcement authority or the court is making the
determination."'
Under both the FTAIA and the IAEAA, jurisdictional confusion in the
courts continues. In fact, several aspects of each Act obscure the landscape
of antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction even further. In the absence of clear
direction from the Supreme Court, a more focused and extensive legislative
scheme addressing jurisdictional issues may be required.
breakup of fax paper cartel).
197. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6203. Section 6203 provides the following in relevant part:
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Authority of the District Courts. On the application of the Attorney General
made in accordance with an antitrust mutual assistance agreement in effect un-
der this Act, the United States district court for the district in which a person re-
sides, is found, or transacts business may order such person to give testimony or
a statement, or to produce a document or other thing, to the Attorney General to
assist a foreign antitrust authority with respect to which such agreement is in ef-
fect under this Act
(1) in determining whether a person has violated or is about to violate any of the
foreign antitrust laws administered or enforced by the foreign antitrust authority,
or
(2) in enforcing any of such foreign antitrust laws.
198. Id.
199. H.R. Rep. No. 772, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994) ("These specifications are de-
signed primarily to require that the arrangement be reciprocal ... that the foreign antitrust
authority provide similar antitrust investigatory assistance in return ... ").
200. Cf Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and
Yokota, 46 RUrGERS L. REv. 821, 861-62 (1994) (sufficient factual showing of all-
encompassing conspiracy among contractors, suppliers, and subcontractors along vertical
chain must hurdle difficult threshold jurisdictional test).
201. See Chung, supra note 7, at 406.
19981
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IV. EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTITRUST POLICY
In 1977, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released the Antitrust Guide
to International Operations.2 0 2 The DOJ published the Guide with the intent
of providing domestic companies with international operations some frame-
work for determining what conduct abroad might be prosecuted under the
Sherman Act.203 In this initial incarnation of the guidelines, the DOJ pre-
sented their enforcement policies through a series of hypothetical business
situations, illustrating for domestic business executives with international
operations when and how the DOJ would apply antitrust law.2"' Though the
1977 Guidelines contained little explicit discussion of policy,"5 both the dis-
cussion and the hypothetical cases explained an enforcement policy founded
on existing case law.206 The policy was straight-forward: The DOJ would
seek to prosecute anticompetitive conduct abroad that was affecting United
States commerce, whether the effects be suffered by exporters, importers, or
consumers. 
2 07
The Antitrust Enforcement Guide to International Operations (1988)20
provided much more discussion of DOJ policy than its 1977 predecessor. As
in the 1977 Guidelines, the 1988 Guidelines used hypothetical scenarios to
exemplify guideline application. However, the Guidelines went further by
stating explicit DOJ theories that would reduce antitrust enforcement
abroad.0 9 The 1988 Guidelines marked a DOJ retreat from existing case law
on extraterritorial jurisdiction and proposed that jurisdiction be exercised
only when foreign anticompetitive conduct affected American consumers.210
In contrast to the 1977 Guidelines, the DOJ clearly indicated a refusal to ac-
knowledge that the Sherman Act offered any substantial protection for do-
mestic exporters.2"' The Guidelines seemed to acknowledge the trend toward
202. 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 67.
203. See Brockbank, supra note 5, at 20.
204. Id.
205. Donald I. Baker & Bennett Rushkoff, The 1988 Justice Department International
Guidelines: Searching for Legal Standards and Reassurance, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 405,
406 (1990) (noting that the 1977 GUIDELINES contained only eight and a half pages of dis-
cussion followed by fourteen case hypotheticals with explanations).
206. Id. at 412.
207. Id. at 412, 413, 427; 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 4-5.
208. ANTITRUST DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988) (Special Supp.) [hereinafter 1988
GUIDELINES].
209. Baker & Rushkoff, supra note 205, at 410 (105 pages of theory preceding eight-
een hypothetical cases, each with a more lengthy discussion than in the 1977 GUIDELINES).
210. Id. at 406 (comparing the 1977 GUIDELINES with the 1988 GUIDELINES); 1988
GUIDELINES, supra note 207, at § 4.1, n.159.
211. Id. at 415. See also Brockbank, supra note 5, at 24 ("1988 Guidelines emphasized
that American exporters were not of primary concern in application of antitrust laws").
24
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reasonable comity analysis."' However, in keeping with the FTAIA, the
1988 Guidelines also seemed to require a preliminary effects test, set forth
in what later became a significant footnote:
Although the FrAIA extends jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to con-
duct that has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on the
export trade or export commerce of a person engaged in such commerce
in the United States, the Department is concerned only with adverse ef-
fects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers by reducing output
or raising prices." 3
This footnote resulted in a more limited "effects" inquiry that worked to
limit the DOJ's extraterritorial application of antitrust laws to only those
situations where an effect on American consumers was threatened. 4 The
DOJ's departure from case law made the 1988 Guidelines more theoretical
than practical, more a statement of what the law should have been rather
then what is was." 5
The DOJ ended its self-imposed limitation on antitrust enforcement in-
ternationally in 1992, rescinding footnote 159 in the wake of Harford
Fire."6 In rescinding the footnote, the DOJ declared that it would take
"action against conduct occurring overseas that restrains United States ex-
ports, whether or not there is a direct harm to U.S. consumers. .,, .2"7 This
rescission during the Bush Administration was apparently approved of by
the Clinton Administration, as the latest version of the DOJ's Guidelines
continued the shift from consumer protection to domestic exporter protec-
tion.
In 1995, the DOJ once again issued guidelines that exhibited a change
in enforcement emphasis."' Relying in large part on Hartford Fire,"9 the
212. The 1988 GUIDELINES, supra note 208, at § 5 explained that
[in performing a comity analysis, the Department first asks what laws or poli-
cies of the arguably interested foreign jurisdictions are implicated by the conduct
in question. In many cases, there will be no actual conflict between the antitrust
enforcement interests of the United States and the laws or policies of the foreign
sovereign. For example, the anticompetitive conduct in question may also be
prohibited under the laws of the foreign sovereign. If that is true, then there
should be no conflict with the laws of the foreign sovereign resulting from ap-
plication of the U.S. antitrust laws. The same is true when the anticompetitive
conduct is neither encouraged nor prohibited under the national laws or policies
of a foreign sovereign.
213. 1988 GIDELINES, supra note 208, at § 4.1, n.159 (emphasis added).
214. Shank, supra note 26, at 165.
215. See Baker & Rushkoff, supra note 205, at 406, 414, 415.
216. Id.
217. DOJ Policy Regarding Anticompetitive Conduct that Restricts U.S. Exports, re-
printed in 62 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1560, at 483 (Apr. 9, 1992).
218. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ANTrRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, reprinted in 68
ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1707 (Special Supp.) (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter
19981
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DOJ adopted a more aggressive, pro-enforcement stance regarding interna-
tional antitrust violations."' Though similar to both the 1977 and 1988
Guidelines in generalized format,' the emphasis of the 1995 Guidelines
was different in that it included jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act in-
ternationally." On releasing the Guidelines, Diane P. Wood, Antitrust Divi-
sion Deputy Assistant Attorney General, stated that three fundamental prin-
ciples emerged from the 1995 Guidelines. First, government agencies would
enforce antitrust laws to the "fullest extent." '223 Second, enforcement would
not discriminate on nationality grounds or location of the conduct.24 And
third, principles of international comity would be observed.225 However, the
third principle proved to be absent from practical application of the Guide-
lines in all but a Hartford Fire "true conflict" sense.
In addressing the DOJ's position regarding international comity, the
1995 Guidelines detailed eight factors that would be considered when de-
termining whether to prosecute foreign anticompetitive conduct.226 But in
claiming that these factors would be considered, the DOJ made no statement
1995 GUIDELINES].
219. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
220. See Brockbank, supra note 5, at 22 (quoting Antitrust Department official as
stating that the 1995 GUIDELINS reflect a "pro-enforcement stance").
221. The 1995 GUIDELINES had a discussion section followed by hypothetical cases
explaining how the DOJ would make its determinations about whether enforcement action
was warranted. Like those issued previously, the general purpose of the 1995 GUIDELINES
was to provide a framework that would inform the decisions of those domestic and foreign
companies involved in international operations with possible effects in the United States.
See cf. Brockbank, supra note 5, at 20 (same purpose as past guidelines); Carol Aciman,
Reengineering the International Corporation: Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Non-
U.S. Conduct Affecting Foreign Markets, Consumers or Producers, 10-SPG INT'L L.
PRACrcuM 5, 6 (1997) (urging practitioners to review 1995 Guidelines for indications of
enforcement intentions).
222. 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at § 1; Brockbank, supra note 5, at 22.
223. Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Op-
erations: An Introduction, Address Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section
(Apr. 5, 1995), available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 150745 (D.O.J.).
224. Id. at *2.
225. Id. at *3.
226. 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at § 3.2. The DOJ stated it would consider
the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the United
States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons in-
volved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or absence of a purpose to
affect U.S. consumers, markets, or exporters; (4) the relative significance and
foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the United States as compared to
the effects abroad; (5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action; (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or
articulated foreign economic policies; (7) the extent to which the enforcement
activities of another country with respect to the same persons, including reme-
dies resulting from those activities, may be affected; and (8) the effectiveness of
foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action.
26
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about what weight the various factors carry toward determining if extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction is appropriate.2" Furthermore, after stating the various
comity factors to be considered, the Guidelines then cite Hartford Fire for
the proposition that no conflict exists for international comity consideration
where an alleged violator can comply with the laws of both countries.22 The
1995 Guidelines then state that evaluations of foreign antitrust laws and
policies will be made; where United States enforcement measures are
deemed by the DOJ to be better able to resolve the "competitive problem,"
however, the DOJ and FTC will pursue the enforcement.229
The result of the DOJ's expanded view of jurisdiction, as illustrated in
the 1995 Guidelines, was to confuse the practical limits of the Sherman
Act's reach even further. The Guidelines were met with significant criticism
from the international trading community: DOJ enforcement actions might
be limited only by how far American exports flowed in the international
stream of commerce. 30 The DOJ asserted that, once agencies had determined
that extending jurisdiction was proper, judicial review of comity considera-
tions was unnecessary."' This statement in effect lobbied for two judicial
standards: one of no judicial comity analysis for public action and Hartford
Fire "true conflict" analysis232 for private action.233
In addition, the evolution of DOJ enforcement policy from the 1977
Guidelines' effects on commerce, to the 1988 Guidelines' effects on con-
sumers, to the expansive 1995 Guidelines' Hartford Fire conflict limitation
has contributed to international mistrust of United States antitrust enforce-
ment. This mistrust results in little incentive for the international community
to refrain from enacting laws designed to defeat the exercise of Sherman Act
enforcement.23 Little incentive exists to join with the United States in shar-
ing discovery and cooperating in enforcement activities as contemplated by
227. See Brockbank, supra note 5, at 28 (policy statement in 1995 GUIDELINES that
international comity will be considered "rings hollow").
228. 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at § 3.2.
229. Id.
230. Aciman, supra note 221, at 6 (acknowledging criticism that domestic policy is
being used to assert jurisdiction anywhere U.S. goods and services flow outside the U.S.).
231. 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at § 3.2, states the following:
In cases where the United States decides to prosecute an antitrust action, such a
decision represents a determination by the Executive Branch that the importance
of antitrust enforcement outweighs any relevant foreign policy concerns. The
Department does not believe that it is the role of the courts to "second-guess the
executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity concerns under
these circumstances."
Id. (quoting United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990),
aff'd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
232. See supra note 14.
233. See Dam, supra note 6, at 319-22 (discussing the use of the jurisdictional rule of
reason in private action versus public action).
234. See discussion of international legislative responses infra Part V.
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the IAEAA " when official DOJ policy proposes dismissing conflict with
foreign antitrust law deemed ineffective.236
V. INTERNATIONAL MISTRUST OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST POLICY
The history of court opinions, enforcement policies, and antitrust stat-
utes clarifies the reason behind international mistrust of United States anti-
trust enforcement: inconsistency. 37 One significant result of this confusion
is the suspicion of United States antitrust actions by the international com-
munity. 38 Foreign states take various measures specifically to defeat the ef-
fect of United States enforcement, allowing those foreign governments to
give their resident trading entities predictability in their United States com-
mercial interactions.3 9 Allowing avoidance of treble damage awards 40 via
"claw-back" provisions14' and discovery or judgment blocking2 42 are just a
few examples of how governments have hindered United States antitrust en-
forcement. At the root of these efforts is resentment of what is perceived as
an invasion of sovereignty, namely the United States extending its law to
235. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6201-12 (Supp. 1995).
236. The DOJ may be taking steps to change international perceptions. The Depart-
ment formed the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee in November 1998
to advise the DOJ's Antitrust Division on international antitrust policy and competition-
related matters. The committee is composed of experts from the academic, business, labor,
legal, and economic communities. According to Assistant Attorney General Joel I. Klein,
the division is seeking guidance and assistance on methods for dealing with the emerging
global economy. The committee's first meeting occurred in February 1998, when it gath-
ered information from Antitrust Division officials and opened discussions on future en-
forcement policy. ICPAC Begins Deliberations on Formation of Coherent International
Antitrust Policy, 66 U.S.L.W. 2533 (Mar. 10, 1998).
237. See Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 788-89 (1984) (comparing contrary views on federal court jurisdic-
tion in international antitrust actions).
238. Hawk, supra note 61, at 13-20 (international criticism of inconsistent federal an-
titrust law application creates uncertainty for U.S. businesses attempting to plan operations
around federal antitrust regulation).
239. See infra Part V.
240. The United States is the only country allowing a treble damages remedy whereby
a private plaintiff can recover three-fold damages from the defendant. See Griffin, supra
note 45, at 302 ("Because it is viewed as penal by foreigners, the treble damage remedy is
one of the principal irritants in international antitrust disputes.").
241. Atwood & Brewster, supra note 48, § 4.17 (discussing foreign laws that attempt
to thwart efficacy of antitrust awards). Through "claw-back" provisions, foreign nations
allow their domestic companies held liable in U.S. for treble damage awards to file an ac-
tion in the foreign nation to recover the excess damages.
242. See, e.g., Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws
to Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral 41greements for Resolving International
Conflicts Within the Pacific Community, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 295, 298-303
(1993) (discussing blocking laws of Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea); Cira, supra note
45, at 248-60 (discussing measures taken by foreign sovereigns to avoid U.S. antitrust en-
forcement).
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adjudicate foreign commerce disputes affecting foreign interests.243
Another somewhat bizarre reason for the international community tak-
ing measures to block application of American antitrust laws is rooted in the
recent efforts to clarify application of the laws. For example, Hartford
Fire's true conflict test provides an incentive for a foreign nation to enact
anticompetitive laws as a protective measure.'" Because Justice Souter's
opinion claimed that jurisdiction was proper absent a defendant's inability to
comply with the laws of both sovereigns, foreign nations are encouraged to
create a conflict as a protective measure. 45 Thus, the resolution of Hartford
Fire and the official adoption of that approach in the 1995 Guidelines2" has
established a strange irony in Sherman Act enforcement: A statue designed
to promote free market principles is enforced in a manner that encourages
efforts to impede international commerce. 7
This international community mistrust of United States antitrust en-
forcement efforts poses significant challenges, if not risks, at this particular
juncture in history. 8 The global economy is here. 49 Economic unions are
forming in every corner of the world. Asia, North America, Europe, and
more have concluded or are negotiating treaties for international com-
merce. 5 It is essential to United States economic interests that the antitrust
policy affecting international commerce at least be clear and predictable.25
International competition agreements require stable antitrust policies to fa-
cilitate any discussion of cooperation and international consistency among
trading partners.252 In turn, this cooperation is necessary to have the prom-
ised benefit of a "global" economy and to realize the meaning of "trading
partners" in actual practice rather than a mere label.253
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 401(b).
244. See Dam, supra note 6, at 307-08 ("one perverse and no doubt unintended conse-
quence").
245. Id.
246. See discussion supra Part IV.
247. Dam, supra note 6, at 308.
248. Richard 0. Cunningham & Anthony J. LaRocca, Harmonization of Competition
Policies in a Regional Economic Integration, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 879 (1996).
249. Robert. Reich, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY CAPITALISM, chs. 10, 25 (1991). See also 1 STAFF OF FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION,
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE, ch. 1A (1996), reprinted as 424 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), Extra Edition 1-
11 (June 11, 1996).
250. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATIT); North American Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S. (NAFTA); Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC TREATY).
251. Hon. Christine A. Varney, Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The
Federal Trade Commission and International Antitrust, Address Before Fordham Corporate
Law Institute 23rd Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (New York
Oct. 17, 1996), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 672397.
252. Id.
253. "[A]ntitrust issues are increasingly world issues." Fox, supra note 46, at 1; see
also Himelfarb, supra note 112, at 953-54 (discussing benefits of converging antitrust con-
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VI. TOWARD EXERCISING JURISDICTION CONSISTENTLY
The history of Sherman Act enforcement via the federal courts has
proven to be a mixed bag. ' Predictability of result depends greatly on
which circuit hears the case.255 Likewise, legislative efforts to clarify the ju-
risdictional problem have serious flaws that inject greater confusion into the
picture.2
56
The current trend toward bilateral agreements between trading partners
is a positive step, but this method of establishing agreement on antitrust en-
forcement does not come without inherent drawbacks. 57 First, the agreement
is just between trading partners, thereby limiting the effect of its enforce-
ability to only the parties. Second, these compacts must be individually ne-
gotiated, varying from agreement to agreement. 258 This individual negotia-
tion will bear differences, possibly significant, between the various
agreements, providing only a partial answer to the current problem of incon-
sistency in application of enforcement policy. 259 Furthermore, this inconsis-
tency is exacerbated by the time required to negotiate individual agreements.
The lengthy process would overlap elected administrations with a possible
difference in views between administrations affecting the substance of
agreements.2" The result could be what is now a difference in enforcement
emphasis becoming a difference in agreement emphasis. Lastly, the years of
international mistrust of United States antitrust enforcement make even
trading partners hesitant to enter into agreements encompassing anti-
competition provisions.26" ' Consequently, bilateral agreements present a
short-term step toward clarifying the antitrust enforcement landscape, but
fall short of being a long-term solution. These agreements also fail to estab-
lish the stable antitrust policy on the broader international scale that is nec-
essary to foster American economic interests in the developing global econ-
omy.26
2
cepts between EU and United States to facilitate trade).
254. See discussion of judicial tests forjurisdiction, supra Part II.
255. Id.
256. See discussion of legislative measures affecting jurisdiction exercise, supra Part
HI.
257. See Fox, supra note 46, at 13-14.
258. See Griffin, supra note 45, at 304-05.
259. See Chung, supra note 7, at 411.
260. Cf. Brockbank, supra note 5, at 34 (noting change in enforcement activity by then
new Clinton Administration); Aciman, supra note 221, at 8-9 (advising multinational cor-
porations on actions to take in light of Clinton Administration antitrust activism).
261. Canada entered an agreement with the United States in 1985 regarding coopera-
tion on criminal antitrust matters; however, agreement on non-criminal matters was not
reached until 1995. See supra note 194; Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding the Application of Their Com-
petition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, State Dept. No. 95-205 (Aug. 3, 1995),
reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 13,503.
262. See supra Part IV.
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EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
To capture the trust of the international trading community as the global
economy expands, a change from isolated determinations of foreign anti-
competitive act jurisdiction by the courts, the legislature and government
agencies must be coordinated on a scale larger than individual bilateral
agreements can affect. 63 A clear line of demarcation must separate the issues
over which the United States will enforce the Sherman Act and those it will
not."6
One possible resource for coordinating international antitrust policy is
the World Trade Organization (WTO) 65 By working with the nations in-
volved, the WTO may be able to produce a unified and consistent competi-
tion policy, thereby ensuring competitive markets and laying a foundation
for predictability on when enforcement actions will be instituted.2" Though
originally lacking any ability to resolve conflicts in competitive policy,2" the
WTO has recently taken steps to determine whether the organization is a vi-
able forum for normalizing international competition policy. 68 A possible
format for this approach involves having WTO signatories adopt a basic
policy of having no unreasonable restraints on trade.6 The WTO would
then act as arbitrator in disputes between member nations involving anti-
competitive practices violating the basic agreement." ° An initial hurdle for
this approach would be ensuring that the antitrust laws of the member na-
tions accounted for this proposed global trade principle.' This move toward
WTO resolution of international competition issues holds promise as a pre-
scriptive device." Consistent multilateral global policy addressing anticom-
263. Cf Fox, supra note 46, at 12 (suggesting "intertwining" trade and antitrust policy
to strike a balance in addressing concern that broader policy would risk United States'
competitive advantage); Chung, supra note 7, at 411 (promoting establishment of a spe-
cialized international agency to resolve international antitrust disputes).
264. See Chung, supra note 7, at 409.
265. See Fox, supra note 46, at 9.
266. Id. at 23-24. But see Shank, supra note 26, at 187 (arguing that a multilateral an-
titrust standard is unrealistic and unworkable due to conflicts of national interests between
parties).
267. J.G. Castel, Q.C. & C.M. Gastle, Deep Economic Integration Between Canada
and the United States, the Emergence of Strategic Innovation Policy and the Need for
Trade Law Reform, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 12 (1998).
268. See Edward Krauland et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 1996,
Business Regulation, International Trade, 31 INT'L LAw. 433, 435 (1997) (WTO formed a
working group in 1996 to investigate relationship between trade and competition policy);
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE WORKING GROUP, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL ANITRUST CODE
AS A GATr-MTO-PLURILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT, July 10, 1993, reprinted in 65
ANrrTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1628, S-1 at 24 (Aug. 19, 1993) (providing draft
of proposed international antitrust rules and recommending WTO as proper body to imple-
ment).
269. See Fox, supra note 46, at 23-24.
270. Id. at 24.
271. Id.
272. Cf. id. at 23-24 (describing current problems faced with differing standards of
antitrust enforcement and their resolution through a baseline WTO standard); Gupta, supra
1998]
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petitive activities would resolve the problems raised by diverse United
States jurisdictional tests and should also remove foreign protectionist
measures now shielding some anticompetitive practices."
Unfortunately, the roadblocks to normalizing this method of global
competition appear insurmountable. Any attempt to normalize competition
policy on a global scale will encounter significant resistance. The United
States, with proven competition laws, is suspicious of a global standard.
274
Other nations with substantial international trade but little historical compe-
tition policy, such as Japan and Great Britain, are equally suspicious of a
WTO body making competition policy.S These countries, historically
avoiding extensive competition law and perceiving themselves as victims of
United States antitrust enforcement policy, are unlikely to agree to a global
body imposing an international standard higher than their own. 6 Finally,
new entrants into the international trading community, such as countries that
were a part of the former Soviet Union, view the competition laws enacted
to spur growth as a symbol of their newly acquired sovereignty.27' Requiring
these nations to sign on to an international competition policy would likely
be compared symbolically to the lack of sovereign autonomy they experi-
enced under the former Soviet system."8 Consequently, the prospects of
having competition policy regulated from a single global perspective appear
remote in the near term.
But the rush to find new methods to deal with international trading
competition conflicts may be premature. The United States judiciary has a
long history of adjudicating antitrust disputes. 27' Prior to Harford Fire,"'
federal courts were using tests that varied in one form or another, but essen-
tially resulted in consistent outcomes. 8' In the short term, little justification
exists for looking further than the judiciary for certainty in determining for-
eign antitrust jurisdiction that considers international comity.
note 18, at 2317 (discussing the prescriptive nature of antitrust law).
273. With a baseline agreement on how and when antitrust action will be pursued,
"claw-back" provisions and blocking laws may become unnecessary.
274. See Starek, supra note 46, at 17 (U.S. concerns on lowest common denominator
approach); Fox, supra note 46, at 12 (U.S. reluctant to change in light of perceived com-
parative advantage); Christian Johnson et al., Presentation: U.S. Antitrust Laws and the
Global Market: National and Extraterritorial Enforcement, 9 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 169,
177 (1997) (WTO unlikely to take action when countries involved cannot or will not on
their own). But see Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 77 B.U. L. REv. 343, 379 (1997) (U.S. gives WTO first competition law dispute be-
cause of "turf' struggle within U.S. enforcement agencies).
275. See Waller, supra note 274, at 384.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 384-85.
278. id.
279. The Sherman Act became law in 1890.
280. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
281. See supra Part 11 for a discussion of tests used in foreign antitrust disputes and the
results obtained.
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2 [1998], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss2/6
19981 EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
As the Ninth Circuit demonstrated in Timberlane 422 the federal judici-
ary is more than capable of devising methods for considering international
comity in international antitrust disputes. 83 The Supreme Court left the cir-
cuits to consider these factors until the 1993 Hartford Fire decision. Justice
Souter's language in Hartford Fire284 and the hesitation of the courts since
that decision to extend jurisdiction without some type of comity analysis 85
lend support to the view that the jurisdictional rule of reason does have a
role to play in international antitrust actions.2"6
To allow the judiciary an opportunity to establish greater credibility
with the international community for their determinations of jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court must establish a uniform analysis of international comity in
antitrust disputes. The role of the United States in the economics of rapidly
growing international trading is far too important to allow as many different
tests as there are circuits. In the absence of a clear rule, the DOJ has gone so
far as to suggest that the judiciary not review decisions to take enforcement
actions against foreign conduct made by the Executive Branch.2" This sug-
gestion by the DOJ may have merit for public enforcement actions sup-
ported by the input of federal agencies involved in international relations;288
however, a large number of competition disputes are brought in private ac-
tions without government participation.288 In this context, a judiciary using
the Hartrord Fire true conflicts comity test could do the most harm to future
trade relations.20 Thus, some form of jurisdictional rule of reason followed
by all federal courts is needed to foster consistent results in public and pri-
vate enforcement actions. Such consistency would allow trading partners of
282. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
283. See Timberlane I comity factors, supra Part lI.C; 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Johnson et al., supra note 274, at 184 (discussing ability of the judiciary to
adjudicate antitrust disputes).
284. 509 U.S. at 798 ("[I1nternational comity would not counsel against exercising ju-
risdiction in the circumstances alleged here.").
285. See discussion supra Part H.D.
286. See Dam, supra note 6, at 319 ("[Olne may conclude that the jurisdictional rule
of reason has more certainty and workability than sometimes argued.").
287. 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at § 3.2 ("The Department does not believe
that it is the role of the courts to 'second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to the
proper role of comity concerns under these circumstances."') (internal citations omitted).
288. See Dam, supra note 6, at 319-20. But see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality
and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument For Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 101 (1998). Prof. Dodge contends that the judiciary is better suited to invoke a unilat-
eral approach, like that of the Hartford Fire intended effects test, when making jurisdic-
tional inquiries. Id. at 161. He argues that unilateral jurisdictional decisions can better
compensate for legislatures sustaining competitive trade advantages by underregulating
domestic companies engaged in export trade. ld. at 156-58. Dodge suggests judicial unilat-
eralism, or rather the desire to avoid it, will encourage the international community to ne-
gotiate agreement on competition policy more quickly than approaches that consider inter-
national comity. Id. at 167.
289. Id. at 324-28.
290. Id.
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In the midst of a rapidly expanding global marketplace with regional
trading blocks vying for a competitive position, the long-developing United
States international antitrust policy has yet to make predictable when juris-
diction will be extended extraterritorially. As the international community
moves toward free trade agreement, domestic corporations are hindered by
the consequences of that disarray, which include "claw-back" provisions,
judgment blocking, discovery blocking, diplomatic protests, and foreign na-
tions' hesitation to enter antitrust enforcement agreements.
As the industrialized nations and emerging countries align with a vision
of the one-world global economy and the promise it holds, they must com-
mit to establishing international agreement in their antitrust policies. 192 The
United States should be a participant in this vision, if not a leader. To be-
come a leader, the judiciary and non-judicial policymakers, legislative or
executive, must establish clear extraterritorial jurisdiction guidelines that are
(1) predictable and consistent, (2) in harmony with the sovereignty concerns
of the international community, (3) protective of American consumers, and
(4) protective of American business engaged in international competition.
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